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The Commercial Exception: A Necessary Limitation
to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
The objective of antitrust law is to protect competition.1 The Sherman
Act, 2 antitrust law's primary vehicle, contains broad language which could
be read to proscribe any and all anticompetitive activity. The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejects this construction. The Court's Noerr-
Pennington4 doctrine immunizes' from antitrust liability acts of petitioning
1. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as a rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces win yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down
by the Act is competition.
Id. at 104 n.27 (citing Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 365 U.S. I, 4-5 (1958)). See
also, e.g., Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951); infra notes 63-64 and accompanying
text.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide:
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court.
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. §§ 1, 2.
4. This doctrine takes its name from two leading Supreme Court cases in this area: Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
5. The term "immunizes" refers to conduct the Supreme Court never intended to proscribe
by the antitrust laws. This is distinguished from the term "exemption," which refers to conduct
that would otherwise come within the scope of the antitrust laws, but which the Supreme Court
deems exempt. Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication
Before Administrative Agencies and -Courts-From Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited,
29 WA sH. & LEE L. REv. 209, 209 n.2 (1972).
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the government even if the petitioning results in the restraint of trade. The
basis for this immunity is that petitioning the government constitutes political
activity, which was never intended to be regulated by the Sherman Act. 6
Antitrust law governs purely economic relationships, and not political re-
lationships. 7 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine establishes that the goals of
antitrust law are subservient to a representative democracy's need for private
input.' The exact boundaries of this doctrine, however, have yet to be
determined.
Some lower federal courts have articulated a "commercial exception" to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, holding that efforts to influence government
officials are not immunized from antitrust liability when the government is
acting in a purely commercial capacity.9 Other federal courts have rejected
the validity of the commercial exception. 10 This split between the federal
circuits" has resulted in inconsistent adjudication.' 2
This Note argues in favor of the commercial exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. Section I examines the background to the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine. Particular attention is devoted to the reasoning behind the
Supreme Court cases on which the doctrine is based: Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.; 3 United Mine Workers
v. Pennington;4 and California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited.'5
Section II discusses the commercial exception to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. This section articulates the theoretical and legal justifications for the
6. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
7. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
11. Currently, courts in the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have accepted
the validity of the commercial exception. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); F. Buddie Contracting
v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.,
435 U.S. 992, reconsidered and restated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-
Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,527 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
Courts in the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have rejected the validity of the
commercial exception. See, e.g., Reamco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Independent
Taxi v. Greater Houston, 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Airport Car Rental Litig., 693
F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
Courts in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not discussed the commercial exception. The
Tenth Circuit's position is ambiguous. See Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo. 1975).
12. Johns-Manville, 259 F. Supp. 440, and Whitten, 424 F.2d 25, involve almost identical
facts. Yet the court in Johns-Manville held that Noerr-Pennington applied, while the court in
Whitten recognized the commercial exception.
13. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127.
14. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657.
15. California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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commercial exception. Finally, Section III explains how the commercial
exception should be applied to promote both the objectives of antitrust law
and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE Noerr-Pennington DOCTRINE
A. The Noerr Case
The Supreme Court first immunized political activity from antitrust liability
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Transport.'6 The
litigation in Noerr grew out of an "economic life or death"'' 7 struggle between
railroads and the trucking industry for the lucrative long-distance hauling
of heavy freight business. Forty-one Pennsylvania truck operators and their
trade association brought the complaint against twenty-four Eastern rail-
roads, their trade association, and a public relations firm retained by the
railroads. The truckers charged that the railroads had conspired to restrain
trade and monopolize the long-distance freight business in violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.'" Specifically, the complaint alleged that
the railroads had engaged the public relations firm to conduct a publicity
campaign designed to influence the Governor and state legislature to enact
and enforce legislation unfavorable to the trucking business. 19 The complaint
described the campaign as "vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent" because the
railroad's sole motivation was to harm the truckers and eventually eliminate
them as competitors. In addition, the campaign disguised the views as being
expressed by disinterested private persons and civic groups, when in fact
they were disseminated by the public relations firm and paid for by the
railroads.20
The railroads' objectives were highly offensive in terms of antitrust policy.
They intended to monopolize the long-distance freight business through
conduct other than providing superior service to consumers. Monopoly is
socially undesirable because a monopolist maximizes profits by reducing the
supply of his product and increasing the price.2' This results in a reduction
in the amount of gain from trade available to the community as a whole.22
Accordingly, if the railroads were successful in their attempt to monopolize
16. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
17. Id. at 129.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
19. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-30.
20. Id.
21. For a thorough discussion of monopoly theory, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRuST ANAYsis
§ 114 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. Rv. 1,
13 (1982).
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the freight industry, the cost of shipping freight would have increased and
the amount of shipping would have decreased. It is this situation that the
Sherman Act intends to proscribe.2
On the other hand, the means the railroads' chose to monopolize the
freight industry were acceptable; they utilized the political process. The
railroads successfully lobbied the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a law
which would have allowed the truckers to carry heavier loads, thereby making
their business more profitable.Y In a representative democracy, it is appro-
priate for private groups to attempt to enlist the aid of the government in
furtherance of their personal interests.
Faced with these competing policies, the Supreme Court held that the
railroads' conduct was immunized from antitrust liability. It concluded that
"mere attempts to influence the passage and enforcement of laws'"' do not
fall within the scope of the Sherman Act. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied on three considerations. First, the Court noted that there is an
"essential dissimilarity ' 26 between agreements to seek legislation and agree-
ments traditionally condemned by the Sherman Act, such as price fixing and
group boycotts. z7 Second, the Court emphasized that in a representative
democracy, private parties must be able to make their desires known to their
representatives. Applying the Sherman Act to this conduct would impute to
the Act a purpose to regulate political activity, not business activity; this
purpose was never intended by Congress. 2 Third, the Court stated that
finding the railroads' conduct illegal would "raise important constitutional
questions ' 29 because the right to petition is protected by the first amend-
ment.
30
Given the competing interests, the Court's position in Noerr is well taken.
Immunizing joint efforts to influence government officials vested with the
23. Id.
24. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 130.
25. Id. at 135.
26. Id. at 136.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id. at 138.
30. The first amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
The Court diminished the significance of the first amendment as a factor in its decision by
explaining in a footnote that under its view of the proper construction of the Sherman Act,
it was not necessary to consider the constitutional questions. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 132 n.6.
Subsequent decisions applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, have rested squarely
on the first amendment right to petition. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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power to make public policy decisions does impede the goals of antitrust
law. But antitrust objectives are subordinate to a representative democracy's
need for private input. The "essential dissimilarity" the Court spoke of
between successful lobbying efforts and conduct traditionally condemned by
the Sherman Act is the element of causation. Under our system of govern-
ment, elected officials have the authority to determine the amount of com-
petition that is desirable. In making this determination, government officials
are influenced by a myriad of sources, not the least being those directly
interested in the legislation. If a producer is fortunate enough to induce the
government into granting him a monopoly, then the government action is
the cause of the monopoly, not the producer's lobbying efforts. An injured
competitor's remedy lies in the political process, not the antitrust laws.3
Similarly, the Court properly distinguished between political activity and
business activity for the purpose of applying the Sherman ActA2 In holding
that political activity was immunized from antitrust liability, the Court
defined political activity in terms of its function rather than the intent of
the petitioner.3" Both political and business activity typically are motivated
by self-interest. The political process is grounded on the assumption that
self-interest will compel private parties to inform their representatives of
their desires. It follows that the right to lobby cannot be conditioned on
the petitioner's intent to benefit himself.3 4 Such a policy would bereave
government of a lode of information. The distinguishing characteristic of
political activity, then, is not the intent of the petitioner, but that it results
in the free flow of information between the public and private sectors. Sound
31. See 1 P. AREaauA & D. TURNER, ANTITRusT LAw 202b (1978).
One commentator finds the Court's "essential dissimilarity" argument unpersuasive. Fischel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 80, 83 (1977). He asserts that the Court's
suggestion "that atypical, untraditional anticompetitive agreements are not violative of the
antitrust laws is contrary to prevailing precedent." Id. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (it is not the form of combination or the particular
means used but the result which is condemned by the antitrust laws); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (Sherman Act encompasses all acts within the spirit or
purpose "without regard to the garb in which such acts are clothed").
Fischel's error is that he defines "essential dissimilarity" in terms of the conduct's appearance
("atypical, unusual"), rather than its procedural relationship to the resulting restraint of trade
(lack of causation).
32. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
33. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139 ("A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify
people from taking a public position on matters in which they are financially interested would
deprive the government of a valuable source of information . . .
34. The Court states:
The right of people to inform their representatives in government of their desires
with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to
depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people
to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to
themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors.
1987]
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public policy requires informed policymakers. Political activity is protected
because it serves a necessary function in a democratic society.
Following its broad pronouncement of antitrust immunity for political
activity, the Court articulated an exception to this immunity. 5 It observed
that there may be situations in which efforts to secure government action
are a "mere sham"36 for what are actually direct efforts to harm a com-
petitor. These bad faith activities are not immunized from the Sherman
Act.3 7
Although the "sham" exception may appear inconsistent with the Court's
earlier statements concerning the irrelevancy of the petitioner's intent,3 the
two positions are reconcilable. The intent to achieve personal gain or anti-
competitive ends is irrelevant, provided the petitioner actually intends to
influence the passage and enforcement of laws. If the petitioner does not
intend to influence government action, but merely seeks to directly disad-
vantage a competitor, then the "sham" exception applies.39 Accordingly,
the petitioner's conduct is not immunized from antitrust liability. Because
the petitioner seeks to harm a competitor directly, and not through govern-
ment action, it is the petitioner's conduct that caused the injury and not
the government action. There is no "essential dissimilarity" between these
efforts and efforts normally condemned by the Sherman Act. Likewise, if
the petitioner does not have a good faith intent to influence the passage and
enforcement of laws, then the petitioner's conduct does not serve the purpose
of providing valuable information to public policymakers. In sum, if the
conduct is a "sham," the reasons for immunizing political activity from
antitrust liability are absent. More importantly, the "sham" exception il-
lustrates that there is no blanket immunity for acts of petitioning the gov-
ernment. Immunity is based on the function of the petitioning, not on the
participants.
B. Noerr Extended to Include "Broader Schemes"
United Mine Workers v. PenningtonW" expands the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Noerr to include "broader schemes." ' 4' In Pennington several small
coal operators alleged that the United Mine Workers (UMW) and several
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id.
37. Id. For an example of an application of the "sham" exception, see infra notes 52-60
and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. See Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe
prerequisite motive for the sham exception is the intent to harm one's competitors not by the
result of the litigation but by the simple fact of the institution of the litigation." (quoting
Gainsville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (S.D. Fla. 1980))); Grip-
Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The line [between
protected and unprotected petitioning] is crossed when [defendant's] purpose is not to win a
favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others, by the process
itself-regardless of outcome-of litigating."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
40. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
41. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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large coal operators conspired to eliminate the small coal operators as com-
petitors, thereby monopolizing the coal industry in violation of the Sherman
Act. The complaint charged that the UMW and large operators jointly
lobbied the Secretary of Labor to establish, pursuant to authority granted
to him under the Walsh-Healey Act,42 abnormally high minimum wage rates
for the employees of contractors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA). This, in turn, made it difficult for the small operators to
compete in the TVA market. The complaint also charged that the UMW
and the large operators persuaded the TVA to curtail its spot-market pur-
chases, which in large part were exempt from the Wash-Healey minimum
wage requirements. This effectively eliminated the TVA as a buyer of the
small operator's coal.
The Court found that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that
efforts to influence the Secretary were illegal if part of a broader conspiracy
to eliminate the small operators as competitors. 43 The Court phrased this
narrow holding in extremely broad language. It stated that "[i]oint efforts
to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing
alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." 44
The decision in Noerr was based on "evidence consisting entirely of activities
seeking to influence public officials." 45 Pennington's. grant of immunity to
conduct that is part of a "broader scheme" represents a considerable ex-
tension of Noerr."
Although the Court neglects to articulate its basis for shielding attempts
to influence the Secretary of Labor from antitrust liability, Pennington
appears to be a straightforward application of its reasoning in Noerr. The
Secretary of Labor, in setting the Walsh-Healey minimum wage, was acting
in the capacity of a labor policymaker which involves political, rather than
purely economic, considerations. 47
Whether the TVA's purchasing decisions were made in a political or
economic framework is less clear. On the one hand, the TVA was established
for the purpose of encouraging agricultural and industrial development.-
Thus, it may have made its purchasing decisions in support of the Secretary
42. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1982).
43. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
44. Id.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46: See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MIcH.
L. Ray. 333, 336-37 (1967); Oppenheim, supra note 5, at 213-14.
One commentator asserts that Pennington extends Noerr to include attempts to influence the
executive branch, rather than only the legislative branch. See Fischel, supra note 31, at 85.
The holding in Noerr, however, already encompassed both the legislative and executive branches.
See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
47. See Fischel, supra note 31, at 85; Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts
to Influence Government Action, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 847, 853 (1968).
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1982).
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of Labor's minimum wage policy. If this is the case then Pennington is
consistent with Noerr because Pennington involved a policy decision. On
the other hand, the TVA's purchasing decisions may have been made on
purely economic grounds. Indeed, the TVA is statutorily required to act on
an economic basis. 49 If the TVA's decisions were entirely economic then
Pennington could be interpreted as expanding antitrust immunity to attempts
to influence purely commercial government actions. The Court, however, is
silent on whether it considered the TVA's actions to be political or economic
in nature.50 This ambiguity has contributed to confusion in the lower courts
concerning the validity of the commercial exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.5 1
C. Noerr-Pennington Extended to Adjudicatory Bodies
In California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,52 the Supreme Court
extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to include joint efforts to influence
administrative agencies and courts.53 The litigation in California Motor
Transport was instituted by fourteen California highway carriers against
nineteen competitors, who allegedly conspired to monopolize and restrain
trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The complaint asserted that the
defendants engaged in a systematic program to oppose before state and
federal courts virtually all of the plaintiffs' applications to the government
for additional motor carrier operating rights. Such government-granted op-
erating rights were required by law for a carrier to conduct business. The
complaint alleged that the defendants' purpose for opposing the plaintiffs'
applications for operating rights was to eliminate them as competitors.
The district court, reasoning that the defendants' conduct was protected
by Noerr-Pennington, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. 54
The Court of Appeals reversed on alternative grounds: 55 It held either that
Noerr-Pennington applies only to joint efforts to influence the passage and
enforcement of laws, and not to proceedings before agencies and courts; or,
49. Id. § 831 h(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
50. See Costilo, supra note 46.
51. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 32 n.7
(1st Cir. 1970) (arguing that the UMW's overtures before the TVA were "a reasonable addendum
to the main proceedings before the Secretary" and thus political), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970); contra Bustop Shelters v. Convenience and Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (asserting that the commercial exception is "inconsistent with Pennington,
which involved government purchases of coal-certainly a commercial activity").
52. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. 508.
53. Id. at 509.
54. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp., 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,298
(N.D. Cal. 1967).
55. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
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if Noerr-Pennington does apply, that defendants' conduct fell within the
"sham" exception articulated in Noerr.56
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' first ground, stating
that "[c]ertainly the right of petition extends to all departments of the
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of
the right of petition."' ' The Court relied exclusively on the first amendment
right to petition as its basis for extending antitrust immunity to administrative
agencies and courts, rather than resting on its construction of the Sherman
Act as it did in Noerr.5 s
But the Court emphasized that the right to petition is not without limits;
it does not necessarily give defendants antitrust immunity.s9 Indeed, in the
instant case, defendants' alleged actions constituted an abuse of the right to
petition. The Court concluded that the "sham" exception applied, affirming
the Court of Appeals' second ground. Defendants' actions served to "harass
and deter [plaintiffs] in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings
so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals." Because
their conduct was a "sham," defendants were not immunized from antitrust
liability.
The Court went on to acknowledge the distinction between the legislative
and executive branches on the one hand, and courts and agencies on the
other.6° It illustrated this distinction by explaining that practices which may
be condoned in a political context, such as misrepresentations or unethical
conduct, 6' have no place in the adjudicative process and will not be im-
munized from antitrust liability if used for anticompetitive purposes 2 The
basis for differentiating between these branches lies in the framework within
which each operates. Adjudication occurs within the strictures of existing
laws, statutes, precedent, and the facts of the instant case. The system works
properly only to the extent that this information is presented accurately
before a tribunal. The political process, however, operates within less con-
stricted bounds. Its purpose is to address all matters of public concern.
Political policymakers rely on a variety of sources of information in dis-
charging their duty. The Court's extension of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
56. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; Oppenheim, supra note 5, at 215.
57. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
58. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
59. The Court stated that:
Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be
heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers. That right, as
indicated, is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment. Yet
that does not necessarily give them immunity from the antitrust laws.
California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
60. Id. at 512-13.
61. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145 (defendant's political activity was protected, even though
it was "fraudulent," "deceiving," and "malicious").
62. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
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to adjudicatory bodies, therefore, did not diminish the Court's concern that
officials vested with broad policymaking discretion are informed.
Noerr, Pennington, and California Motor Transport constitute the Su-
preme Court's discussion of antitrust immunity for attempts to influence
governmental officials. Lower federal courts have looked to these three cases
for guidance in defining the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The
lack of clarity in Supreme Court case law has lead to the current split
between the federal circuits concerning the validity of the commercial ex-
ception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
II. THE COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
A. Theoretical Basis for the Commercial Exception
The economic objective of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare
by protecting competition and preventing monopoly.63 Competition allows
scarce resources to be allocated most efficiently and encourages the devel-
opment of new techniques to better use those resources. Competition may
also promote non-economic goals that are commonly valued. It distributes
wealth, limits the power and size of any one business, creates opportunities
for entrepreneurs, and allows one's success or failure to be determined by
the impersonal forces of the market, rather than the prejudices and predi-
lections of private groups which may control the essential support systems. 4
Clearly the law may have goals other than promoting economic efficiency.
For example, it may attempt to alleviate poverty or racial inequalities. The
Supreme Court first recognized that antitrust laws are not intended to pro-
hibit the government from implementing policies which may have anticom-
petitive ends in Parker v. Brown.65 Accordingly, antitrust immunity for valid
government action is known as the Parker v. Brown doctrine.
In Parker, the California legislature established an agricultural marketing,
or "prorate" system designed to avoid ruinous competition within the state's
raisin industry. A commission appointed by the Governor and confirmed by
the State Senate administered the system. The commission was empowered
to control the marketing of each raisin grower's crop, thereby controlling
the supply and price levels in the industry. The Supreme Court assumed that
this program would have violated the Sherman Act if it had been the product
63. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) ("Congress was dealing
with competition, which it sought to protect and monopoly, which it sought to prevent."); R.
BoaK, Trm ANTITRusT PARADox 51 (1978) ("The only legitimate goal of American antitrust
law is the maximization of consumer welfare .... "); supra note 1.
64. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 31, 103.
65. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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of private agreement, but refused to apply the antitrust laws to the facts of
the case before it. The Court concluded that:
nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ... suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature ....
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no
contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of
trade or to establish monopoly, but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint
as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to
prohibit.6
The Court in Parker held that valid government actions are immunized from
antitrust liability.67
Noerr-Pennington follows naturally from Parker v. Brown; because Parker
permits the government to engage in anticompetitive policies, antitrust law
must not prohibit private parties from informing the government of their
anticompetitive desires.6 The objective of Noerr-Pennington is to insure that
the political process functions properly.
The government often participates in the economy in a commercial or
proprietary capacity. Indeed, the government is the single largest consumer
in the United States; government purchases constitute twenty percent of the
gross national product. 69 The government may make purchases in support
of policy decisions,70 or it may act on purely economic grounds. 71 When the
government makes commercial decisions based solely on economic consid-
erations, its role in the market is identical to that of private consumers. It
66. Id. at 350-52.
67. To receive antitrust immunity for state actions under the Parker doctrine, the Supreme
Court requires (1) that there exist a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed State policy
to displace competition, and (2) that the State itself, not a private party, actively supervise any
anticompetitive action exercised at the State's insistence. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558, 570 (1984); Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-55 (1982);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
When there is a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition through regulation,
however, such regulatory bodies need not act under strict state supervision. See Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985); Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
68. It is important to note the differences between Parker v. Brown and Noerr-Pennington.
When the government chooses to displace competition without being petitioned to do so by
private parties, Parker applies but Noerr-Pennington does not. When private parties petition
the government to displace competition, but the government refuses to take such action, Noerr-
Pennington applies but Parker does not.
69. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTicAL ABSTRACT OF TBE UN=an STATEs 432 (1986).
70. See City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,527 (W.D.
Ga. 1981) (city accepted bids for paving contracts only from contractors who could satisfy
affirmative action guidelines).
71. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.
1970) (city awarded contracts under competitive bidding statutes), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
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is bidding for scarce resources along with all other participants in the market.
The forces of competition efficiently allocate resources regardless of the
identity of the actors; the invisible hand is no respecter of persons. As long
as competition is unrestrained, consumer welfare will be maximized. In this
instance, the government has not chosen to displace competition to pursue
other policies, as it did in Parker. Instead, it has chosen to act on a purely
economic basis. The regulation of economic relationships is the dominion
of antitrust law. Private parties who trade with the government when the
government is acting in a purely commercial capacity should not be im-
munized from antitrust liability. There should be a commercial exception to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Without a commercial exception, society sacrifices consumer welfare while
gaining nothing in return. The benefit society enjoys from the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine is clear: The democratic process functions properly because
people are free to make their desires known to their representatives. In so
petitioning, private parties communicate the information needed by the gov-
ernment to make informed policy decisions. When the government acts as
a consumer, the choice concerning which specific -item to purchase is no
longer a policy decision. The government official who makes the actual
purchasing decision only has the authority to compare products, not restrain
trade. This does not imply that the government official may only consider
price when. choosing a product. When making a decision based on purely
economic grounds, the official, like any rational consumer, should take into
account numerous factors, such as quality, promptness of delivery, and
availability of future service. Private sellers are encouraged to inform the
official about any of these factors. This conduct constitutes proper sales-
manship, or what antitrust law terms "rivalry on the merits." But if the
private sellers' sales techniques include efforts to persuade the government
to accept a price-fixing scheme, a boycott of a competitor's product, or any
other illegal arrangement, then the benefits of competition are lost. Worse
yet, the political process goals of Noerr-Pennington are not furthered because
this was not intended to be a policy decision requiring private input.
The seminal case advocating the commercial exception illustrates this point
well. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,72 the
plaintiff, Whitten, and the defendant, Paddock, both manufactured equip-
ment for pipeless swimming pools. The market for this equipment was largely
composed of public and quasi-public agencies. These agencies were required
by law to operate under public competitive bidding procedures. Whitten
alleged that Paddock violated the antitrust laws by inducing private archi-
tects, who were hired by the agencies to supervise pool construction, to
adopt specifications supplied by Paddock that were drawn so narrowly so
72. Id.
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as to exclude all competitors. Paddock's tactics ranged from high pressure
salesmanship to fraudulent statements to threats of litigation.73
The district court summarily dismissed Whitten's complaint, holding, inter
alia, that Paddock's actions were immunized from antitrust liability by Noerr-
Pennington.7 4 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in a thoughtful opinion
by Judge Coffin, vacated the district court's findings.7 5
Judge Coffin reasoned that the purpose of Noerr-Pennington is to insure
uninhibited access to public policymakers. Because the architect in Whitten
was not vested with "significant policymaking discretion, ' 7 6 Paddock's at-
tempts to influence him were not the kind of political activity that Noerr-
Pennington protects. 77 Judge Coffin concluded that the legality of Paddock's
selling practices should be judged without regard to the identity of the
customer when the government is acting under competitive bidding statutes.78
The government agency 79 in Whitten was acting as a consumer shopping
for swimming pools. The legislature, by mandating competitive bidding,
made the policy decision that pools were to be purchased on a purely
economic basis. Paddock's attempts to influence the government's architect
contributed nothing to the needs of a representative government in a dem-
ocratic society. But by eliminating competition, its conduct may have in-
creased the price the public was forced to pay for pools. Resources were
misallocated and consumer welfare decreased. 0 Judge Coffin recognized that
immunizing Paddock's conduct would frustrate antitrust policy without fur-
thering the objectives of Noerr-Pennington. Indeed, if Paddock had been
dealing with private pool builders rather than the government, he would not
have enjoyed antitrust immunity. Since the government under these condi-
tions is no different than a private buyer, it makes little sense to change the
rules.
In sum, antitrust law governs purely economic relationships. Its goal is
to maximize consumer welfare by protecting competition. The government,
73. Id. at 27.
74. The district court reasoned that Noerr-Pennington protected Paddock's conduct because
it was directed toward a quasi-governmental official. Id.
75. Id. at 36.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id.
78. It is important to note that applying the commercial exception does not mandate a
finding that the defendant is liable for an antitrust violation. The commercial exception merely
negates the immunity granted by Noerr-Pennington. For example, Judge Coffin held that
Paddock's actions were not immunized from antitrust liability. He remanded the case for a
determination of whether Paddock actually committed a violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
On remand, the court found that Paddock did not in fact violate the antitrust laws. George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
79. For purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the private architect hired by the
government agency is considered an agent of the government. See Whitten, 424 F.2d at 28.
80. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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however, has the authority to engage in anticompetitive activities. Accord-
ingly, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes from antitrust liability joint
efforts to influence the government to pursue policies that may be inconsistent
with the goals of antitrust law. The commercial exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is based on the recognition that the government, in
addition to being a policymaker, is the nation's largest consumer. When
acting in a purely commercial capacity, the government's posture in the
market is identical to that of a private consumer; its decisions are economic,
not political. Immunizing private parties who deal with the government in
this context will result in the misallocation of resources without improving
the political process. A theoretical analysis, therefore, supports a commercial
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
B. Legal Basis for the Commercial Exception
Supreme Court precedent supports the commercial exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. The holdings in Noerr, Pennington, and California
Motor Transport were phrased in terms of broad verbal formulae.81 Lower
courts have tended to give undue attention to this broad language while
ignoring the reasoning or factual basis behind these holdings. As a result,
courts have granted blanket immunity for odious anticompetitive conduct
merely because it was directed toward the government. s2
Clearly, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not establish blanket antitrust
immunity for attempts to influence the government. The "sham" exception,
which was originally articulated in Noerr 3 and explicated in California Motor
Transport84 demonstrates this point. In California Motor Transport, defen-
dants' petitioning was directed toward the adjudicatory process. Defendants,
however, had no intention of using this process for the purpose for which
it was created-the just resolution of controversies. On the contrary, their
purpose was, as the Court stated, "to usurp that decision making process. 85
81. See California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("Cer-
tainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the government." (emphasis added));
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint efforts to influence
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws .... " (emphasis added)). See also Comment,
Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act and "Government Action" Immunity Reconsidered,
71 CoLrM. L. Rav. 140, 150 (1971).
82. For example, in Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Colo. 1975), the defendant, an agricultural marketing association, paid bribes and made illegal
campaign contributions to government officials. Id. at 699. In return, the officials mandated
a minimum price of milk which drove small milk producers out of business. Id. The court
held that defendant's conduct was immunized from antitrust liability by Noerr-Pennington. Id.
at 705. See also Comment, supra note 81, at 150.
83. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
85. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511.
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Defendants' conduct, therefore, was a "sham," and not immunized from
antitrust liability. The reasoning behind the "sham" exception is that efforts
to petition the government are not immunized when proper functioning of
the governmental process is not necessary for the petitioner to achieve his
goal. This reasoning applies equally to the commercial exception. When the
government acts in a commercial capacity, its goal is to maximize efficiency.
The proper functioning of the political process is not necessary for it to
achieve this goal. Accordingly, there is no reason to immunize efforts to
influence the government when it is acting as a consumer.
Moreover, blanket immunity for activity involving the government would
be inconsistent with the government's right to damages resulting from an-
titrust violations. Section 4A of the Clayton Act 6 allows the government to
recover when it has been injured by an anticompetitive practice. The rea-
soning behind this statute is that immunizing private parties merely because
the government is the victim of an improper act has no theoretical justifi-
cation. For example, if several manufacturers of electrical generators con-
spire as to the price each will bid for various government contracts to
purchase generators, the anticompetitive effect is no different than if this
illegal conduct was directed toward a private buyer. In both cases, resources
are misallocated and consumer welfare is decreased.87 The Supreme Court
recognized this fact in Georgia v. Evans.8 The Court stated that "[n]othing
in the [Clayton] Act, its history, or its policy, could justify"8' 9 immunizing
a wrongdoer solely because his victim is the government. 9° The commercial
exception is based on this same reasoning. The damage caused by anticom-
petitive activity is the same whether the victim is the government or a private
party. When the political process is not implicated, tolerance of anticom-
petitive conduct is unwarranted.
Furthermore, there is not an "essential dissimilarity" 9' between joint ef-
forts to influence the government acting in a commercial capacity and efforts
to influence private parties. As stated previously, petitioning government
policymakers is essentially dissimilar from conduct traditionally condemned
by the Sherman Act because policymakers have the discretion to override
antitrust objectives to promote other ends. Any resulting monopoly is caused
86. Section 4A of the Clayton Act states:
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property by
reason of any thing forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefore in the
United States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover actual damages by it sustained and the cost of the suit.
15 U.S.C. § 15A (1982).
87. See P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 31, 206c.
88. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
89. Id. at 162.
90. See Whitten, 424 F.2d at 31.
91. See supra notes 26, 31 and accompanying text.
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by the government legitimately exercising its authority to displace competi-
tion. When acting in a purely commercial capacity, the government has made
the decision not to exercise its authority to displace competition. The gov-
ernment, therefore, is not the cause of any resulting monopoly. Antitrust
immunity for private parties when the government acts in a purely commercial
capacity cannot be grounded on the "essential dissimilarity" between lob-
bying activity and activity traditionally condemned by the antitrust laws.
Likewise, the first amendment right to petition does not invalidate the
commercial exception. California Motor Transport's extension of antitrust
immunity to adjudicatory agencies and courts rested squarely on the right
to petition.92 The Court did not discuss the "essential dissimilarity," or
political process arguments, which formed the basis for its holding in Noerr.
In light of this omission, some lower federal courts have asserted that
California Motor Transport implicitly overrules the commercial exception. 93
These courts reason that the commercial exception, as articulated in Whit-
ten,94 is grounded on Noerr's emphasis on immunity for efforts to influence
government officials vested with broad policymaking discretion. Because
adjudicatory agencies and courts do not possess broad policymaking discre-
tion, antitrust immunity cannot be restricted to efforts to influence policy-
makers. Such courts argue that the first amendment right to petition is
absolute. 95 Moreover, these courts, based on the notion that the right to
petition is absolute, have not engaged in traditional first amendment freedom
of expression analysis. By baldly asserting that the right to petition im-
munizes the conduct, they accord this right greater protection than that
accorded other first amendment freedoms.
This reading of California Motor Transport lacks merit. The Court in
California Motor Transport stressed that the right to petition is not without
limits. 6 Indeed, the Court held that the defendants were not immunized,
92. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
93. See In re Airport Car Rental Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 1982) ("It is possible
that California Motor Transport implicitly overruled ... Whitten."); Bustop Shelters v. Con-
venience and Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[Whitten] has been
disapproved in this circuit, as implicitly overruled or weakened by California Motor Trans-
port."); Reamco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 556 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In
Reamco, the district court stated:
Reamco's argument, based on Whitten, that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in-
sulates only those acts aimed at influencing governmental action on broad policy
questions involving the passage or enforcement of legislation, and not actions
related to narrow issues between specific parties, must be rejected in light of
California Motor Transport's contrary conclusion.
Id.
94. Whitten, 424 F.2d at 25.
95. See Greenwood Utils. v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1505 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663
F.2d 253, 266 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1981).
96. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513-14.
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despite their right to petition, because they were using that right to violate
valid antitrust statutes. 97 Their petitioning efforts were a "sham" because
they did not legitimately intend to invoke the processes of the adjudicative
agencies and courts.98 The Court's concern in California Motor Transport
was the same as that in Noerr; both cases protect legitimate efforts to
influence the governmental process. The right to petition, therefore, does
not automatically immunize efforts to influence any governmental official. 99
It is the process, not the person, that legitimizes the right. 100
Furthermore, the right to petition does not warrant greater constitutional
protection than other freedoms of expression. The Supreme Court, in
McDonald v. Smith,10 firmly established that the right to petition1°2 should
be treated no differently'03 than other first amendment rights.'04 Under tra-
97. The Court stated:
Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts ....
That right, as indicated, is part of the right to petition protected by the First
Amendment. Yed that does not necessarily give them immunity from the antitrust
laws.
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation
when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
98. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
99. See Ashland-Warren, 1982-1 Trade Cas. 72,925 ("[Defendants] do not have absolute
immunity based on First amendment grounds .... ").
100. This point is demonstrated by examining the classic language of Noerr's holding. Noerr
holds that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). The "passage or enforcement of laws" describes a process,
not a person.
101. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
102. Prior to McDonald, the Supreme Court had seldom interpreted the right to petition.
See Fischel, supra note 31, at 96; Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STr~A. L. REv. 1243, 1247 (1984). In the few
instances when the Court had made references to the right to petition, it was usually included
with the right of speech, assembly, and association. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-12 (1982) ("The established elements of speech, assembly, association,
and petition, 'though not identical, are inseparable.' "); United Transp. Union v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1971) (upholding labor union's right to solicit membership based on the
"First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly"); United Mine Workers
v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) ("We hold that the freedom of speech,
assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner
the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal
rights." (footnote omitted)); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1966) ("[I]n view of
petitioners' purpose to protest ... their conviction denied them rights of 'free speech, assembly,
petition .. . .' "). See also Note, supra, at 1247-48.
Although the Court, prior to McDonald, had never expressly stated constitutional guidelines
for applying this right, it suggested that this right be treated similarly to other rights of
expression. See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54-55; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (in
dicta, the Court implies that analysis for speech applies to all first amendment freedoms of
expression).
103. The importance of McDonald cannot be overemphasized. By establishing that the right
to petition requires the same constitutional analysis as other freedoms of expression, McDonald
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ditional freedom of expression analysis, first amendment conduct receives
considerable, but not absolute, protection. 10 5
Commercial speech is accorded less constitutional protection than other
forms of expression. 1°' The Supreme Court defines commercial speech as
speech which proposes a commercial transaction.'07 Moreover, speech may
substantially undermines decisions that reject the commercial exception. These courts baldly
assert, without engaging in traditional freedom of expression analysis, that the right to petition
invalidates the commercial exception. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
At a minimum, McDonald overrules the reasoning of these decisions rejecting the commercial
exception. Moreover, this Note asserts that traditional first amendment jurisprudence invalidates
the outcome of these cases.
104. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, stated:
To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition
Clause to special First Amendment Status. The Petition Clause, however, was
inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms
to speak, publish, and assemble. These First Amendment rights are inseparable,
and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment
expressions.
Id. (citations omitted).
A similar theme marks Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun:
The Framers envisioned the rights of speech, press, assembly, and petitioning as
interrelated components of the public's exercise of its sovereign authority ....
And although we have not previously addressed the precise issue before us today,
we have recurrently treated the right to petition similarly to, and frequently as
overlapping with, the First Amendment's other guarantees of free expression.
There is no persuasive reason for according greater or lesser protection to
expression on matters of public importance depending on whether the expression
consists of speaking to neighbors across the backyard fence, publishing an editorial
in the local newspaper, or sending a letter to the President of the United States.
Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Pornography is protected unless:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary standards would find that the work
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; (b) .. . the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c)... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan
leader's speech advocating political reform through violence is protected unless such advocacy
is "directed to inciting and producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (false speech directed at
public officials is protected unless made with "actual malice").
106. See, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct.
2968 (1986); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) ("[IThe Constitution
accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms
of expression."); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (the Court recognized "the 'common sense' distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech").
107. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. Bolger involved a first amendment challenge to a federal statute
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be classified as commercial even though it contains "discussions of important
public issues."' 08
Speech falling within the commercial exception is clearly commercial. The
commercial exception applies to communication directed at public officials
vested only with the authority to administer commercial transactions. Private
parties have occasion to interact with officials possessing this limited au-
thority solely to offer or advertize the availability of goods or services. 109
The communication between private parties and the officials, therefore, does
"no more than propose a commercial transaction." 110 Even if the interaction
involves some noncommercial discussion, the speech would still be classified
as commercial. Taken as a whole, the speech merely furthers a transaction."'
The constitutional requirements for regulating commercial speech are ar-
ticulated in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission."2 In this
case, the Court developed a four-part analysis:
At the outset, we must first determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."'
prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. The mailings consisted of
flyers specifically naming the product, and informational pamphlets discussing human sexuality
and venereal disease. The Court concluded that the flyers fell "within the core notion of
commercial speech." Id. at 66. In discussing the informational pamphlets, the Court reasoned:
The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly
does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech. Similarly, the
reference to a specific product does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial
speech. Finally, the fact that Youngs has an economic motivation for mailing the
pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to turn the materials into com-
mercial speech....
The combination of all these characteristics, however, provides strong support
for the ... conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized
as commercial speech.
Id. at 66-67 (citations and footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 67-68.
109. While it is hypothetically possible, for example, for a private party to express to a
government purchasing agent his desire for the government to abandon mandatory competitive
bidding procedures, such conduct by private parties is unlikely. The utility of engaging in
political activity before an official possessing no authority to act on any proposal is outweighed
by the minimal time and effort this activity entails. Rational beings rarely undertake doubtlessly
fruitless behavior.
But, even if this expression does occur, the speech is still commercial. McDonald stressed
that the existence of political content in otherwise commercial speech does not alter the status
of such speech. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
110. See Hurwitz, Abuse of Government Process, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries
of Noerr, 74 Gao. L.J. 65, 77 (1985) (asserting that Noerr involves commercial speech).
I11. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
112. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
113. Id. at 566.
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As for the first element-that the expression must concern lawful activity
or not be misleading-one can argue that speech regulated by the commercial
exception fails this test. The commercial exception annuls immunity from
antitrust laws when private parties interact with the government in a purely
commercial capacity. The commercial exception only regulates speech that
otherwise would be illegal under the antitrust laws if directed toward a
private party. This regulated speech, then, does not concern lawful activity.
Under this reasoning, the Central Hudson test is not met and the speech
receives no constitutional protection.
Even if this argument is not dispositive, the speech is not automatically
protected. For the speech to be protected, the commercial exception must
fail one of the remaining elements. There can be little doubt that the com-
mercial exception meets the second prong-that the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. The government's interest is the protection of com-
petition. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of
this interest," 4 and has held it to be substantial enough to justify regulation
that affects first amendment freedoms." 5
Likewise, the commercial exception directly advances the governmental
interest asserted. Congress has deemed the antitrust laws to be effective in
preserving economic freedom." 6 By requiring compliance with the antitrust
laws, the commercial exception furthers the objectives of enhancing consumer
welfare through unfettered competition.
Finally, the commercial exception is narrowly tailored; it applies in limited
circumstances. By definition, the commercial exception applies to conduct
proscribed by the antitrust laws. All other conduct is outside the purview
of this doctrine. It is impossible for the commercial exception to proscribe
any expression that does not restrain trade. Moreover, the commercial ex-
114. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important
to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a charter of freedom [the Sherman Act is]
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.").
115. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 ("This Court has recognized the strong
governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association."); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S 679, 697 (1978). In National Society, the Court
stated:
While the resulting order may curtail the exercise of [first amendment] liberties
that the Society might otherwise enjoy, that is a necessary and, in cases such as
this, unavoidable consequence of the [antitrust] violation .... The First Amend-
ment does not "make it ... impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements
in restraint of trade . .. ."
Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). See also Note,
A Standard for Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely to the First Amendment
Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832, 839 (1986).
116. See supra note 1.
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ception will not chill otherwise protected speech. The Supreme Court has
recognized that commercial speech is particularly resilient and thus is unlikely
to be chilled. 1 7 The cormmercial exception, therefore, satisfies the four re-
quirements of the Central Hudsofi test.
In addition, the commercial exception minimally abridges private parties'
right to petition." 8 The commercial exception prohibits parties from peti-
tioning certain government officials-those possessing the authority to make
only economic decisions-in a manner that violates the antitrust laws. Private
parties are free to petition officials vested with policymaking discretion in
any manner, irrespective of whether it violates the antitrust laws. This pe-
titioning is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. These parties, then,
are abridged from expressing their desires to officials who have no authority
to act on them, but uninhibited from expressing them to those who do.
Under traditional first amendment freedom of expression analysis, the com-
mercial exception does not violate private parties' right to petition.
The commercial exception is consistent with the Court's reasoning in
Noerr, Pennington, and California Motor Transport. The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine does not create blanket immunity for efforts to influence the gov-
ernment. Rather, it protects efforts to influence decisions that are made
within the framework of the political process. When the government acts in
a purely commercial capacity, the government's interest in protecting com-
petition justifies the minor abridgment of the right to petition. Purely ec-
onomic decisions should be regulated by antitrust law.
III. APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
The commercial exception is based on the premise that there is a fun-
damptal distinction between the political realm and the economic realm.
Accordingly, political decisions should be made within the parameters of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and economic decisions should be governed
by antitrust law. The most troublesome aspect of the commercial exception
is determining when the government is acting in a political or commercial
capacity. This problem is further complicated when the government acts in
a commercial capacity while simultaneously engaging in a policy decision." 9
117. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) ("[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertizing
is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and forgone entirely.").
118. Although not stated as part of the Central Hudson test, traditional freedom of expression
jurisprudence permits greater regulation of lower valued speech-such as commercial speech-
when there is less than total abridgment of such speech. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser,
106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
119. See supra note 70.
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Some lower courts have expressed approval for the concept of the commercial
exception, but assert that it i impossible to administer. 120 Such a concern
is ill-founded. The Supreme. Court's reaspning in Noerr, Pennington, and
California Motor Transport provides guelines for administering the com-
mercial exception.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the scope of the
commercial exception is quite narrow. There are numerous methods of
injuring competition via influencing government processes which do not
implicate the commercial exception. Any legitimate attempts to influence
legislation,' 2' adjudicatory bodies, 122 or the enforcement or execution' 23 of
laws are excluded from the gamut of the commercial exception.2.4 The
commercial exception applies only when the government participates directly
in the economy, typically buying, selling or leasing goods.
To determine whether the commercial exception is applicable, courts should
consider if its application would defeat the objectives of Noerr-Pennington.
As stated previously, the goal of Noerr-Pennington is to insure that the
political process functions properly;125 because government has the authority
to determine the appropriate amount of competition, private parties must
be unconstrained to advocate their self-interest. Whenever the government
makes a policy decision to interact in the economy and displace competition,
private petitioning is necessary and should be protected. Contrarily, when
the government expresses its intent to act on a purely economic basis, the
political process is no longer relevant, and those who petition the government
120. See Greenwood Utils. v. Mississippi Power, 751 F.2d 1484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 903 (1985):
We reject any notion that there should be a commercial exception to Noertfl
Pennington, because although such a distinction may be intuitively appealing ih
proves difficult, if not impossible, of application in a case such as ours where
the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a
participant in the marketplace.
Id. at 1505.
121. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
("[N]o violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws.").
122. Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 263-64
(D.C. Cir.) ("Noerr is fully applicable, for the boards of pharmacy are charged with regulatory
decisions rather than commercial decisions."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1981).
123. See supra note 121.
124. The exponential growth of governmental regulation provides fertile ground for abuse
of administrative and judicial processes in order to injure competition. Would-be competitors'
access to the market is controlled by licensing authorities, zoning commissions, health depart-
ments, building inspectors and a host of other bodies. 'Attempts to influence these bodies are
governed by the "sham" exception, not the commercial exception. See supra notes 39, 52-60
and accompanying text. See also R. Boax, supra note 63, at 347-64.
125. Noerr-Pennington also insures that the adjudicatory process functions properly. Yet
because the adjudicatory process does not implicate the commercial exception, it is irrelevant
to this discussion.
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should be subject to antitrust law. The critical factor is the intent of gov-
ernment in participating in the market.
Requiring a court to determine the government's intent when it enters the
market does not make the commercial exception unadministerable. The Parker
v. Brown 26 doctrine requires this very finding in granting antitrust immunity
for valid government actions. Parker demonstrates that the Supreme Court
regards such an inquiry to be workable. Under the Parker doctrine, there
are two requirements for antitrust immunity for a government action: First,
the anticompetitive activity must be clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy; second, the activity must be actively supervised by
the state itself.12 7 These elements place a significant burden on the party
seeking immunity.
Antitrust immunity for petitioning based on Noerr-Pennington should not
require such a substantial burden. The first amendment right to petition
militates against placing the burden on the petitioner to prove government
intent to displace competition. A more reasoned approach is to require the
petitioner to establish that his conduct was directed toward the government.
Such a showing would establish a prima facie case for antitrust immunity.
The burden of proof would then shift to the challenger to rebut the peti-
tioner's presumption in favor of immunity. This burden could be met by
demonstrating that the government intended to participate in the market on
a purely economic basis. Evidence indicating the government's intent would
consist of mandated bidding procedures, legislative history, or other factors
which reflect the government's desire to maximize efficiency.'2
This approach, in essence, places the burden on the challenger to show
that the petitioner's conduct is not protected by Noerr-Pennington. This
placement of the burden is necessary to avoid whatever slight chilling effect
the commercial exception may have on private parties' willingness to exercise
their right to petition. In contrast to the Parker doctrine, the petitioner's
burden is light. Under Parker, the petitioner has the burden of showing that
the government clearly intended to displace competition. If the government's
position was ambiguous or neutral, the petitioner is denied immunity. Under
the approach suggested by this Note, the challenger has the burden of
showing the government did not intend to displace competition. If its position
is ambiguous or neutral, the petitioner is still immunized. If the challenger
is able to satisfy this burden, the petitioner should have received ample
126. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
127. See supra note 67.
128. The commercial exception is implicated primarily when the government acts under
competitive bidding statutes. This comprises a significant number of all transactions that occur
in the economy. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
The federal government is required to use competitive bidding procedures for substantially
all transactions in which it engages. 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
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warning that his conduct would be subject to the antitrust laws, thereby
eliminating any chilling effect. This approach strikes the proper balance
between the objectives of Noerr-Pennington and antitrust law.
CONCLUSION
The commercial exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be-
come a settled principle of antitrust law. It places a reasoned limitation on
antitrust immunity for attempts to influence the government. By recognizing
that the government, besides being a public policymaker, is an immense
force in the market, the commercial exception harmonizes the objectives of
both Noerr-Pennington and antitrust law. Noerr-Pennington protects the
political process. This process, however, is not implicated when the govern-
ment acts on purely economic grounds. Those who deal with the government
in this context should be subject to the scrutiny of antitrust law. This insures
that the benefits of competition are realized while preserving the integrity
of the political process. Simply stated, when the government acts like a
consumer, it should be treated like one.
MATTHEw R. GuTwEIN
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